The Following Report Represents The Purpose And Vision Of Life Skills U.

Life Skills U Is Rooted In

Proven Principles Of Human Understanding.

 

The foundation principles of Edward Deming were responsible for the real rebuilding of post-war Japan.  These principles brought NASA to be the pinnacle of world recognition for performance and excellence as evidenced by the achievements of the Apollo space program.  These same principles show how they are losing it as evidenced by both the Challenger and Columbia Space Shuttle tragedies.  The mission of Life Skills U is to provide an educational system that will enable organizations of all sizes and shapes to attain and MAINTAIN an organizational culture of performance and excellence by “Creating A Team Culture Responsive To Change”.

 

 

 

Case Study :

Business Lessons from the Columbia Report

 

 

 

 

 

Author :

Byron Crowell

 

Date :

9/10/2003

| Management | Technology | Corporate Governance | Operations |

On February 1st, 2003 NASA mission STS-107 ended tragically with the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia upon reentry to Earth’s atmosphere. The subsequent investigation retrieved thousands of pieces of wreckage strewn across 4 states and interviewed over 200 mission personnel to determine the failures that lead to Columbia’s destructions and the loss of its seven crew members. The newly released Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report provides a candid assessment of both the technical and organizational defects that characterized the disaster. In this study, we looked for lessons that leaders from all business disciplines can learn from the CAIB investigation and how they can be applied to avoid future organizational failures.

 

In their 260 page report, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concludes that “The physical cause for the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing.” This breach apparently resulted from a piece of insulating foam that detached from a connecting bracket to the external tank and consequently struck the wing. This technical assessment was constructed from the evidence provided by the Shuttle wreckage as well as the available mission computer data. However, the CAIB very clearly were interested in the systemic processes that lead to this failure. In total, more pages of the report deal with the culture, management and budgetary processes of the shuttle program than are concerned with the physical items that failed.

 

 NASA’s organizational culture is legendary. In reality, few places are more deserving of pride in their methods and accomplishments than the men and women who have worked in the Human Space Flight program. Historically, the “can do” culture which NASA virtually invented came into being under very different geopolitical circumstances than where it now operates. The Cold War and Space Race presented NASA with a very specific opponent against whom overwhelming resources and acceptable human risk were appropriate measures. This culture found its zenith in the Apollo program and was reinforced by its overwhelming successes.

 

However, the CAIB points out that the organizational and attitudinal requirements for the Apollo program were quite different from those needed for the Space Shuttle. As a reusable, multi-purpose craft, Shuttle missions more resemble the organizational structure of manufacturing than that of the “Right Stuff” test piloting culture of Apollo. Over time, this bias between the needs of Space Shuttle missions and the culture at NASA produced failures in staff communication, decision making processes and even testing procedures.

 

 Clearly this phenomenon is not unique to NASA. In fact, business schools are littered with case studies of corporate mergers and new product launches that produce the same effect; a culture that does not match the tasks at hand. But in NASA’s case it is interesting to note that even the most powerfully successful culture for one set of tasks can fail when those tasks are modified even slightly. For this reason, being specific about organizational priorities and values is paramount to building and maintaining a culture that fits tightly with the requirements of customers, employees, managers and shareholders.

 

 

NASA Finding

Business Lesson
  • Reliance on past success as a substitute for sound practices
  • Continue to look outside the organization and always question "how we do things".
  • Organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety Information and stifled professional differences of opinion
  • Make people feel comfortable to deliver bad news so that it can be digested and acted upon quickly.

·         Lack of integrated management across program elements

  • Be sure all managers know the direction of the organization and be sure they communicate regularly.
  • The evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization's rules
  • Avoid beaurocratic decision procedures that elicit avoidance behavior. Foster a pro-decision environment..
  • The mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental
  • Provide sufficient resources for projects and know the limits of your staff and production capacity.

 

Additionally, the CAIB report examined the nature of culture quoting a close observer of NASA as saying “Cultural norms tend to be fairly resilient… The norms bounce back into shape after being stretched or bent. Beliefs held in common throughout the organization resist alteration.” In particular, the report notes that after the Challenger accident numerous reports, studies and panels made specific recommendations on overhauling NASA’s organizational structure. Ironically, the very culture that captured the moon in only 8 years after President Kennedy’s oration of the goal produced a hubris that, although justifiable, closed off internal communications and debate. The report notes that with NASA’s Human Space Flight Program, “managers strove to maintain their view of the organization. They lost their ability to accept criticism, leading them to reject the recommendations of many boards and blue-ribbon panels…” One must note that the “excesses of success” has been a recurring theme in business stories of late.

 

Not withstanding the structural issues presented in the CAIB report, perhaps the most interesting and educational part of the story of Columbia’s demise involves the “resources versus results” metric leading up to the accident. Much like corporations globally, NASA spent the 1990s trying to become leaner and more efficient. In 1992, the incoming NASA Administrator, Daniel Goldin, adopted Deming management principals  in an effort to reorganize the agency into a more decentralized and nimble entity.

 

(Click To See The Deming Principles)

 

The goal of these efforts was to drive down costs at a time when the NASA budget was under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration and Congress. While its available budget was held at approximately $14billion from 1993 through 2000, its actual purchasing power during that time shrank by 14%. In response, Goldin charted a course for NASA using many of the cost reducing techniques used by modern companies including outsourcing, performance-based contracting, and management consolidation. In retrospect, the organizational achievements made by Goldin during the 1990s cannot be understated. While every single other Federal department grew by at least 4% per annum, NASA whittled its bottom line while maintaining a grueling launch schedule driven by the requirements of the International Space Station. By the time 2003 arrived, NASA was debating the implementation of fractional privatization of the Shuttle Program.

 

Despite the impressive efficiencies that NASA achieved, resources can only be stretched so far. In their report, the CAIB noted that several committees and panels had told Congress since the Challenger accident that the agency “is trying to do too much and allowing too little margin for the unexpected.” Certainly an organization can be pushed to perform at extraordinary levels without the proper resources for short periods of time. However, it is a testament to the men and women of NASA that they were able to maintain the launch schedule of the Space Shuttle for over 15 years with progressively shrinking budgets. The clear message from the CAIB report is that available resources must match task requirements. And while nothing could be more obvious, it is still surprising how many organizations have taken on projects without providing the proper staffing and budgetary resources. Believing that one’s organization can “muscle through” to success by toughness and sheer will is a romantic notion grounded in venture-startup lore. But as the CAIB report points out, this approach produces greater risks both in terms of business inflexibility and potential project failure. And even the most successful organizational culture needs the support of its stakeholders to complete its mission.

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